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Why Security
Forces Do Not
Deliver Security:
Evidence from Liberia
and the Central African
Republic
Andreas Mehler1
Abstract
Little attention has been paid to the factual contribution of the state’s security forces
to the physical security of African citizens. Reports about security forces adding to a
widespread insecurity are frequent: the protectors become violators, and their
appearance causes fear, not security. In many African crisis countries the realization
of better security forces appears to be an elusive goal, either because violent con-
flicts are not definitively settled and therefore do not allow for decent reform or
because a lack of capacity as a result of material constraints is not easy to remedy.
Above all, the political will of governments to reform their security forces, including
their composition and structure, is often limited. This contribution compares the
security provision by official forces in Liberia and the Central African Republic, two
extreme cases of strong and weak international involvement, respectively, in post-
conflict security-sector reform. Blueprint models for such reforms that do not take
into account local expectations and experiences are bound to fail.
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Introduction
The impact of African security forces on the security of the population is rarely at the
center of empirical analysis.1 This may be linked to some blurring recently of what is
meant by security. Human security explicitly focuses on the needs of the individual,
including protection from hunger, disease, and disasters, but at the same time it
waters down the importance of minimal security requirements for the protection
of individuals from physical violence. Many terms, such as food security, job secu-
rity, social security, and so on, rightly point to existential fears. In this article, the
term security—without adjectives—is used instead. However, security refers not
only to the internal security of a state but also to the security of its population from
physical violence, perpetrated by both state and nonstate actors. In the postinde-
pendence era and particularly in so-called socialist African regimes, the military
was sometimes used to provide public services outside the security sector. But
what about the fulfillment of the core security mandate of those forces? Critical
studies about the actual performance of African armies and police forces in provid-
ing security to the citizens are still rare.2 This may be partly explained by the dis-
creet nature of the subject, which is surrounded by an aura of secrecy, particularly
when it comes to nondemocratic regimes. Thus, the topic is not easily researched.
It becomes easier when states have experienced a breakdown of authority and
when a substantial international engagement in the security sector has occurred.
For the purpose of this article, two country cases of external intervention, located
at the two poles of a spectrum of intensity, have been selected: Liberia (very strong
engagement) and the Central African Republic (CAR; rather weak engagement).
This variation in the intensity of engagement is one of the essential differences
between the two countries, which are both (1) very poor (ranked 176 and 178 out
of 179 in the Human Development Index, 2006 values) and (2) small in terms of
population size (3.3 and 4.2 million people in 2006) and which both (3) have a par-
ticularly violent contemporary history.3 Both are also diamond-producing coun-
tries that demonstrate major similarities with regard to associated risk factors
(high resource dependence, low resource abundance, ‘‘lootable’’ resources located
in the periphery, but no discriminated-against minority living in these regions).4
It could be expected that in this context the intensity of outside engagement
has some bearing on the quality of services provided by state security organs
because the following assumptions can be made: (1) the intensity of civil war influ-
ences the stability of formal security forces, and outside engagement (peacemak-
ing, peacekeeping) should lower this intensity; (2) the frequent reshaping of
security forces in line with the directives of new heads of state creates a loyal core,
but a frustrated mass, of security forces, and external engagement in security-
sector reform should be conducive to a professional army beyond the immediate
reach of changing presidents.5
This article explores whether capacity, structure or composition, ongoing violent
conflict, or political will are essential in explaining the weak performance of state
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security forces in providing security. The following familiar assumptions are
scrutinized: First, in theory, governments in resource-rich countries can use resource
revenues to finance a large security apparatus, which should be able to effectively
suppress rebellion—or to provide security (as a public good) for the majority of the
population. The assumption is therefore that the relative size of a security apparatus
varies positively with the level of security. Second, one main assumption on the part
of international promoters and sponsors of security-sector reform is that the existing
security forces are not adequately structured (or financed and controlled) to provide
for that same good. The excessive relative size of presidential guards or other special
forces is symptomatic of this unbalanced structure. Also, the dominance of a few
ethnic groups within security forces may reduce acceptance of these forces within
the population. Third, security forces continuing to fight civil wars are under
extreme pressure and may not be in a position to provide security to ordinary people
under these conditions. Fourth, the relative lack of responsiveness of the ruling elites
toward the ruled—particularly in resource-rich rentier states—expresses itself in the
disregard for the basic security interests of ordinary people.
For this purpose, brief historical accounts of phases of insecurity are recalled,
with an emphasis on the security forces’ involvement (with more emphasis on the
CAR as the security forces played a comparatively bigger role here than in Liberia),
and the potential change imposed by outsiders in the course of ‘‘security-sector
reform’’ is assessed (with more emphasis on Liberia as the reform process there
advanced rather quickly). The political will to have functioning and republican secu-
rity forces on the part of a country’s leadership may or may not be subject to outside
influence. As far as they have been available, popular perceptions of the security
forces are presented and contrasted with the technocratic top-down perspectives
dominant in security-sector reform.
Background and Current Research
It has not been uncommon in African countries for severe security problems to have
started right within the security forces, leading to an escalation of violence or an
inability to deal with it appropriately. A well-known case is Sierra Leone, with its
‘‘sobels’’ (soldiers by day, rebels by night), but many flagrant recent cases (in
Guinea-Bissau 2008–9, Guinea 2009) confirm this impression. It is obvious that
security forces are frequently part of the problem and less often part of the solution
to Africa’s security concerns.
The study of security forces in Africa is traditionally the field of ‘‘securocrats’’:
specialists on questions of armament, the composition, professionalism, and training
of the armed forces, and so on.6 During the cold war the military balance between
competing subregional powers was of obvious interest (e.g., Ethiopia vs. Somalia).
With the now dominant paradigm of state failure and the growing importance of
postconflict reconstruction, this interest has merged more and more with the devel-
opmental approach to security-sector reform.7
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A second strain in the literature on African security forces is rather historically
informed and draws genealogies of armies from their colonial foundation to the
postindependence era.8 A third, and important, part of the literature on security
forces focuses on military regimes and coups or, more generally, the intrusion of the
military into African politics. Some argued that the security sector was oversized,
particularly the military, which only rarely defended the borders against aggressive
neighbors. The reduction of military spending was the order of the day in the 1980s,
and the number of interstate wars in Africa has remained limited. Transformations of
the military apparatus into ethnic factions, a warlord’s support base, and mercenary
organizations have been seen as a deviation from the republican ethos or profession-
alism. Those studies are often very normatively informed.9 In a study on military
coups, McGowan found that the quality of leadership and public opposition to
military rule are important in explaining the rather good performance of four West
African states with regard to conflict and coups in contrast to the rest.10 The interest
in public opinion has to be stressed as it rarely comes to the fore. Even after a suc-
cessful reform of the security sector—and this was arguably the case in Sierra Leone
after 1999—‘‘mistrust of the security forces on the part of the population’’ can
remain the key problem.11 This view from below is too rarely explored. Particularly
rare are any opinion polling data.12 The dominant explanation for the weak perfor-
mance of security forces is weak states.13 This argument could be circular, as secu-
rity is without any doubt one of the core functions of a state across time and space.
Based on this brief overview, it is clear that the study of African security forces is
still seldom interested in the security output of security organs.
In the following paragraphs, which focus on the two case studies selected (CAR,
Liberia), the main sources of information used are media reports, selected nongo-
vernmental organization (NGO) reports, UN Security Council resolutions, and
reports by the UN secretary-general on UNmissions in both countries. This informa-
tion is used because the security sector in general, and demobilization and disarma-
ment in particular, plays an important role in the mandates assigned by the Security
Council. The historical information given here draws on a limited number of articles
and Internet sources. These reports regularly inform external perceptions of the per-
formance of state security forces. Wherever possible, local reactions and voices are
added to this picture. The approach is therefore mostly qualitative. At least for
Liberia, some original data from fieldwork are used; the author also visited the CAR
three times between 1993 and 1999 in the context of a different research project.
The main events of violence since the 1960s (independence of CAR) in both
countries are summarized in Table 1.
Military Rule and Civilian Insecurity in the CAR
One has to acknowledge that the former colonial power France retained considerable
influence long after formal independence; most successful coups are therefore con-
sidered to have been tacitly endorsed by Paris before they actually happened.
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However, it would be an exaggeration to believe that France masterminded these
acts in detail. The administration of the CAR has historically been highly militar-
ized, with three members of the military hierarchy—in fact, actual or former chiefs
of staff—having taken power by force and served as presidents for thirty-three out of
fifty years of independence: Jean-Be´del Bokassa (on December 31, 1965), Andre´
Kolingba (September 1, 1981), and Franc¸ois Bozize´ (March 15, 2003). The first two
successful coups did not result in immediate bloodshed, although Bokassa’s rule
included numerous political assassinations.14
Capacity, Structure, and Composition of the Official Security Forces
According to Berman,15 at the end of ‘‘emperor’’ Bokassa’s reign (1979) a maxi-
mum of 7,500 troops served in the Forces Arme´es Centrafricaines (FACA); the
number was about half that size in the mid-1990s, shortly after civilian president
Ange-Fe´lix Patasse´ (1993–2003) had taken over, which meant that military ruler
Kolingba had actually reduced the size of the army. However, Kolingba had turned
the armed forces into a dominant Yakoma force (his own minority ethnic group). In
2003 the total number of FACA personnel was 4,442; in 2006 the UN estimated the
Table 1. Main Episodes of Violence in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Liberia,
1960–2009
CAR Liberia
1965 Coup d’e´tat by Jean-Be´del Bokassa 1979 Brutally repressed rice riots
1979 Operation Barracuda, French
commando action to replace Bokassa
with his predecessor David Dacko
1980 Bloody coup d’e´tat by Samuel Doe,
Thomas Quiwonkpah, and others, killing
President William Tolbert; public execution
of thirteen further high-ranking government
officials
1981 Coup d’e´tat by Andre´ Kolingba 1985 Failed coup attempt by Quiwonkpah,
massive repression of ethnic Gio and Mano
1982 Failed coup attempt by Ange-Fe´lix
Patasse´ and Franc¸ois Bozize´
1989–96 First civil war, main instigator:
Charles Taylor; Doe killed by the Prince
Johnson faction
1996–97 Series of three army mutinies
against President Patasse´ (elected in 1993)
1997 Series of political assassinations after the
election of Charles Taylor
2001 Failed coup attempt by Kolingba 1999–2003 Second civil war, LURD and
MODEL close to military victory when
cease-fire signed
2001–2 Bozize´ revolt
2003 Conquest of Bangui by Bozize´ (toppling
Patasse´)
2005–9 Series of rebellions in the northern
part of the country
LURD ¼ Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy; MODEL ¼ Movement for Democracy in
Liberia.
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total strength at 4,000 but with only 1,250 elements considered to be operational.16
This means that the army was always small compared to the population of approx-
imately four million inhabitants. The FACA forces were always very weak in arma-
ments and received a particularly low degree of attention under President Patasse´.
The Gendarmerie was made up of more or less an additional 1,300 men (with a
maximum of 1,600 attained in 2002). Under Patasse´, the Presidential Guard offi-
cially counted 642 members but was in reality made up of 900 members.17 Finally,
the police force totals approximately 1,600 members, mostly poorly (or not at all)
armed, with the exception of a special unit to combat gang crime.
Ongoing Conflict
Insecurity has, in fact, been caused not just by the top hierarchy of the army. In
1996–97 three army mutinies undermined the country’s stability (200–500 dead).
While the particular situation in the security sector formed the background to these
mutinies, they also need to be understood within the context of the larger political
environment of Patasse´’s presidency. The first mutiny, in April 1996, was indirectly
tied to Patasse´’s displacement of the former beneficiaries of Kolingba’s regime.
Only one month later the second mutiny erupted, this time involving five hundred
soldiers who claimed that the promises made had not been fulfilled and that certain
strategic decisions were unacceptable. Violence erupted once again in mid-
November 1996; eight hundred rebels were involved, but this time they also had
explicit political aims, demanding the resignation of the president. Only with the
help of international peacekeepers was it possible to end the crisis.
Extrajudicial executions were a daily occurrence after the aforementioned spe-
cial unit to combat gang crime took over the fight against criminality in 1997.18
There is no clear indication whether the population appreciated or resented this
heavy-handedness. A local massacre in Kolingba’s home region of Kembe´ which
mainly targeted an officer loyal to Kolingba, was attributed to the Presidential
Guard. Patasse´ had reason to suspect a good part of FACA of lacking loyalty (and
sympathizing with Kolingba), but his opponents also had reason to suspect the
president of using his Presidential Guard and informal forces for intimidation and
repression.19
During the next crisis in May 2001 the security forces were again at the center of
events. No other major objective of the rebels was achieved. The loyalists regained
the upper hand in the following days, supported by at least three hundred troops of
the rebel leader Jean-Pierre Bemba from the neighboring Democratic Republic of
Congo as well as Libyan forces and helicopters. Kolingba, who still had a solid
power base in parts of the military apparatus, publicly claimed that he had orche-
strated the rebellion.
Crimes against humanity were perpetrated by Mouvement pour la Libe´ration du
Congo (MLC) fighters as well as by security forces and pro-Patasse´ militias, leading
to the (late) opening of investigations by the International Criminal Court in 2007.20
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Security forces were involved, but who exactly was responsible has yet to be
investigated. The persecution of Yakoma families began, houses in specific parts
of the capital were destroyed, and eighty thousand inhabitants fled to the country-
side. The retaliatory acts of the combined security forces, MLC (Bemba’s militia)
and Libyan troops, suggested that a rather simplified interpretation of the rebellion
was at work, with Kolingba, his political party Rassemblement De´mocratique
Centrafricain, and the Yakoma in general being demonized as the source of the con-
flict. However, a judicial investigation of the rebellion revealed that the matter was
more complex. Approximately one hundred arrests were ordered in the course of the
investigations (June–September 2001), contributing to an atmosphere of suspicion
and fear—not least within the security forces. Originally, up to 1,250 FACA soldiers
had reportedly fled over the Oubangui river to neighboring DR Congo.
However, a more serious military challenge emerged, with the dismissal of the
chief of staff Gen. Franc¸ois Bozize´ on October 26, 2001, and the subsequent accusa-
tion that he was involved in a new coup plan. Bozize´ refused to accept an arrest war-
rant; defected with, initially, about one hundred troops; engaged in street battles in
the northern neighborhoods of Bangui (which traditionally supported Patasse´); and
moved to the north of the country. After taking weapons from several Gendarmerie
barracks and fighting a number of skirmishes, possibly involving additional Libyan
troops and aircraft as well as recently recruited young members of progovernment
militias (‘‘Karako’’ and others), Bozize´ went into exile in Chad, drawing with him
up to three hundred FACA members. Only in early 2002 did the government under
Prime Minister Zigue´le´ take full notice of the plight of the army, with all its material
shortcomings and the rampaging corruption within the leadership circles,21 but it
was too late to react. In the end, Patasse´ lost the power game to Bozize´.
Soon after Bozize´’s military takeover, new zones of insecurity developed in the
countryside. Some trouble was attributed to Zaraguinas (highway robbers), but for-
mer ‘‘liberators,’’ that is, the irregular troops who had helped Bozize´ to seize power,
became a real source of concern in the capital Bangui. In a letter to the World Bank
in November 2003, Bozize´ himself gave his total number of men as 1,640, of whom
540 had already been integrated into the FACA and a further 150 identified to follow
suit—leaving another 850 without such a prospect.22 Numerous acts of violence
were perpetrated by these forces in the following months. After difficult negotia-
tions, approximately 200 ex-liberators agreed to be accompanied to the border with
Chad; others agreed to integrate into civilian life after being paid an undisclosed sum
of additional allowances.
The security forces of the CAR were responsible for a number of serious human
rights violations during the gradual escalation process of the northern rebellions
from 2005 onward. The disproportionate use of violence again became very com-
mon. On January 29, 2006, the town of Paoua in the prefecture of Ouham-Pende
(hometown of former president Patasse´) was attacked by rebels. The acts of reta-
liation by the Republican Guard (the new Presidential Guard), acting under the
command of one of Bozize´’s nephews, were even worse. Approximately half of
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the local population reportedly fled the town. The government was accused of
being responsible for the massacre (81–104 dead according to various uncon-
firmed reports).
The security forces also suffered casualties during the new rebellion(s). Two
FACA members were killed close to the provincial capital Birao in May 2006
(Vakaga prefecture). While demonstrations against widespread violence—particu-
larly by the state security organs—took place in Bangui in April and May, new rebel
attacks were launched in Vakaga in June. About twelve FACA soldiers and two Cha-
dian peacekeepers were killed.23 After these attacks, Bozize´ reacted by replacing the
entire FACA leadership. He heavily criticized the army again on August 11 after
eighty soldiers deserted their positions in the northeast of the country, the third time
such an act had occurred. The soldiers were immediately arrested.
The worst was yet to come. On October 30–31, 2006, rebels attacked Birao, kill-
ing ten FACA soldiers and taking the town. A week later the city was reconquered
with massive French assistance. The extreme vulnerability of the regime—and of its
security forces—was exposed by these events. In March 2007, FACA engaged in a
brutal orgy of destruction, destroying up to 70 percent of the houses in Birao.
On the second front line in the north things were not any better. Attacks on Paoua
in January 2007 and on Ngaoundaye in mid-April and mid-May were followed by
severe state repression, particularly by the Presidential Guard. New NGO reports
in 2007 emphatically criticized the government. A Human Rights Watch report was
rejected publicly by the government as grotesque and drawing an unrealistic picture.24
While the report noted severe human rights violations by the rebels, its critique of the
FACA and the Presidential Guard was even harsher and well documented. An
Amnesty International report specifically highlighted the plight of the civilian popu-
lation in the north, blaming the Presidential Guard for brutality and drawing attention
to the inability of the government to protect ethnic Mbororo children from abduction
by armed bandits. In 2008 a ‘‘global peace agreement’’ was reached with most active
rebel movements and an ‘‘inclusive political dialogue’’ was held, but in February 2009
new rebel attacks were being recorded.
Security-Sector Reform and the Absence of Political
Will in CAR
Security-sector reform had its ups and downs during the crisis years in the CAR, but
it always remained very state focused (despite acute state weakness).25 As early as
1998 the UN Security Council called on the government to adopt, as soon as possi-
ble, a plan for the effective restructuring of the armed forces based on proposals sub-
mitted by a competent commission.26 Later, it welcomed the establishment of a joint
committee of the government and the Mission des Nations Unies en Re´publique
Centrafricaine (MINURCA) to address the restructuring of the FACA.27 The respec-
tive UN Security Council resolution called for ‘‘well-balanced geographical and
multi-ethnic recruitment, the improvement of working conditions, including
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payment of salary and salary arrears, the provision of adequate infrastructure,
equipment and support materials, and the redeployment of some of the restructured
units outside Bangui.’’28 Part of the problem was addressed bluntly, but the focus
was exclusively on the state as the only possible provider of security (notwithstand-
ing the small size of the security forces). The UN mission MINURCA (1998–2000)
had inter alia mandates to assist in the capacity-building efforts of the national police
and to provide advice on the restructuring of the national police and special police
forces.29 Before the end of its mandate, the UN Security Council ‘‘strongly encour-
aged’’ the government to coordinate with MINURCA in the progressive transfer of
its functions in the security field to the local security and police forces.30 This series
of events demonstrates that throughout MINURCA’s existence only government and
UN bodies were involved in the reform process; that is,
 Civil society and parliament were kept out of the program, and
 Security providers other than the state’s security forces were not targeted.
After Bozize´’s conquest of Bangui in 2003, two dreaded units, Patasse´’s Presidential
Guard and the intelligence agency, were dissolved. The local UN peace building
office organized the burning of weapons in July 2003. Approximately 400 soldiers,
mostly Yakoma, who had fled to the DR Congo after the failed coup attempt of 2001,
came back, and 80 percent of them were reintegrated into the FACA. The govern-
ment had started a $13 million Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration
program with the United Nations Development Programme and World Bank support
to integrate up to 7,565 former combatants. The insecurity question was on the agenda
of the National Dialogue conference, held in October 2003. Participants noted the fol-
lowing reasons for the failure of national defense forces to assume their mission to pro-
vide security: the anarchical recruitment, the absence of basic training, bad equipment
and low motivation among the rank and file, the absence of barracks, the closing of
training centers, the politicization of the defense and security forces, and the use of
nonconventional forces. This was the basis on which, one month later, the government
wanted to start a reform process by writing a ‘‘letter of general policy in global defense
matters’’ to the World Bank. It committed itself to good governance; good manage-
ment of public finances; the reinforcement of the justice system; the restructuring
of the defense and security forces; and efforts to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate
ex-combatants. During the following four years, however, a coherent reform strategy
was not defined, raising doubts about the political will to make progress.
Security-sector reform programs had limited effects; for example, the number of
personnel trained was not particularly impressive. Between May and December
2007 this training involved a total of one hundred personnel.31 This slow pace was
probably the reason for the establishment of a task force that submitted a paper to
the donor roundtable held in Brussels on October 26, 2007.32 This paper was a rare
example of openness as it noted a ‘‘dysfunctionality of the entire security and justice
sector.’’ It asserted that the series of crises had provoked ‘‘a destructuration of the
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security system without precedent.’’ The concentration of troops in Bangui without
any means of transportation was one aspect highlighted. The heteroclite composition
of the security forces would lead to the absence of cohesion and discipline. The
destruction of infrastructure (barracks, police stations, etc.), the lack of equipment
(arms and ammunitions, vehicles, logistical means), the lack of adapted personnel
(dead, aging personnel; desertions; absence of training; corruption), and the dysfunc-
tional command chain were all mentioned—the mass of mishaps was truly impres-
sive. The morale of the troops was described as being particularly low, with the
notorious salary arrears highlighted. The security forces’ ‘‘uncivilian behavior’’ was
cited as a reason for a ‘‘confidence break with the population which can no longer
identify with them.’’ As the only other security provider, private security companies
were cited in this context. But some pages later reference was made to ‘‘non-official
security forces (private security companies, guerrillas and private militias, rebels)’’
as a ‘‘constitutive part of the security sector.’’ However, concerning planned activ-
ities, all those nonstate actors were left out.
What the civilian population thinks of its security forces is rarely directly reported.
When several incidents involving the FACA in 2001 and 2002 led to bloodshed, the
inhabitants of Bossangoa revolted, marched to the garrison, and demanded the dis-
mantling of the military basis. The troops fired live bullets and killed another person.33
And during his tour of the country’s garrisons in early 2002, Prime Minister Zigue´le´
heard more complaints.34 It was an utter understatement when the UN stated in one of
its reports that ‘‘Central African Republic authorities are having difficulty maintaining
law and order in several parts of the country.’’35 In fact, during the recent crisis in the
north the security forces acted against the civilian population and behaved like an
occupying force, suspecting civilians of indiscriminate support of the rebels and com-
mitting numerous atrocities.
To resume the argument of the preceding paragraphs, the example of the CAR
shows how low capacity, the existence of parallel structures in state security ser-
vices, and the heteroclite composition of the armed forces have been problematic
factors in the performance of the security sector. However, the latter could also
be contributing factors in the rebellions, leading to a deadly spiral of violence and
counterviolence. The political will of the different regimes to promote a republican
army has certainly always been less palpable than the will to have a solid, loyal com-
ponent within the security forces. Weak outside engagement did not lead to any sub-
stantial amelioration.
Oligarchic Rule and Warlord Politics in Liberia: The
Declining Provision of Security
Capacity, Structure, and Composition of the Security Forces
The Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) were created in 1962 under President William
Tubman and received substantial U.S. support during the 1960s.36 The army grew to
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a six-thousand-strong body with a National Guard and a Coast Guard as separate
bodies. William Tolbert became president after Tubman’s death in 1971. Not only
did he lack the support of the general populace, but also he generated dissatisfaction
among the AFL. He alienated the army by removing officers on charges of disloy-
alty.37 The popular bloody coup against Tolbert by then master sergeant Samuel K.
Doe came from the lower ranks, made up mainly of personnel from the hinterland.
During the 1980s Doe recruited soldiers from his own Krahn ethnic group into the
armed forces. In November 1985, former army commanding Gen. Thomas Qui-
wonkpa tried to topple Doe’s regime and failed dramatically. The rebels were
repelled, and Quiwonkpa was executed. Doe carried out reprisals against ethnic
Mano and Gio suspected of supporting the rebellion. Doe himself was murdered dur-
ing the ‘‘first’’ civil war on the orders of rebel leader Prince Johnson in 1990. After
notorious warlord Charles Taylor succeeded in winning first the civil war and then
elections in the 1990s, he marginalized the AFL because of its suspected Krahn iden-
tity. For instance, Taylor’s son Chucky headed the dreaded new Anti-Terrorism
Unit. In contrast to the CAR’s military, the Liberian armed forces lost the ‘‘state’’
label quickly during the civil war and either were regarded as another military fac-
tion in a brutal civil war or were confined to the barracks.38 Hence, it does not make
sense to go into the details of how the army harmed the population’s security inter-
ests as was done for the CAR example.
All other state security organs were quickly personalized under warlord rule. In
the countryside, security forces did not receive adequate pay and therefore lived
from extortion: ‘‘The Special Security Service (SSS) and the Special Operations
Division (SOD), both mobilized to combat Liberians United for Reconciliation and
Democracy (LURD) rebels, consisted of former NPFL [National Patriotic Front of
Liberia] rebels who were paid a one-time fee of $150 and then expected to loot and
pillage to support themselves. In short, a key feature of security institutions in
Liberia has been the gross abuse of human rights (often with impunity) by security
personnel through torture, arbitrary arrests and killings, and the use of official
powers for private gains.’’39 It was obvious that the whole sector was in need of
radical reform when peace was achieved in mid-2003. Liberia became a sort of
UN protectorate, with many fields normally within a state’s jurisdiction under tight
international control.
Peace and Ongoing Insecurity
In contrast to CAR, Liberia did not relapse into war after the 2003 peace agreement.
This is a considerable achievement. However, it should not be confounded with a
situation of general security. Ordinary people today continue to face very real
threats, including armed robbery. The disarmament process was not a complete fail-
ure, but many so-called former combatants merely handed in some rounds of ammu-
nition instead of a weapon. Small arms are obviously still in circulation and are used.
The overall rating of the current security situation is certainly much better than
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before the peace agreement. United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) patrols
control the main axes of Monrovia and relatively safe areas, for example, the posh
quarter of Mamba Point where the embassies are located, but not the remote neigh-
borhoods. Former combatants, now without a job, were easily mobilized by political
entrepreneurs before the 2005 elections. Ethnic (and religious) rivalries top off this
highly explosive cocktail. One of the major local outbursts of violence in postcon-
flict Monrovia involved a confrontation between ethnic Mandingo and other groups
in October 2004 and resulted in the burning of mosques, churches, and gas stations.
UNMIL troops could not prevent the escalation of violence and arrived too late on
the scene. During the war, the LURD rebels were composed mainly of Mandingo,
something that is not forgotten by those who suffered from hunger and starvation
during the siege of Monrovia. On the other hand, Mandingos feel that they are con-
tinuously threatened and treated as second-class citizens. Thus, at least part of the
population continues to feel insecure.
Security-Sector Reform in Liberia: An Uphill Struggle
The UN family of organizations indeed quickly identified security-sector reform as a
prime task: ‘‘In Liberia, one of the key reasons for the relapse into violence after the
end of the first civil war and the 1997 presidential elections was the lack of reform of
the armed and security forces.’’40 Such reform in Liberia was, from its inception,
more circumspect than in the CAR. It was claimed that effective weapons manage-
ment would in the long term also require a comprehensive national policy for the
demilitarization of civilians. Nevertheless, the activities of UNMIL in this field
remained state focused, with the government selected as the primary partner.41
Although the mandatory ‘‘assistance’’ made it sound as if the government would
remain in the driver’s seat of the reform process, a long list of activities attests to the
contrary. Outsiders drove and funded the process to a large extent, first of all
UNMIL (disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration; police reform) and also
the U.S. government (army reform). The entire reform process remained state cen-
tered, with regard to both policy formulation and program implementation: The
defense policy had to be reformulated after decades of turmoil. A Defense Advisory
Monitoring Committee comprising the ministries of defense, finance, information,
and planning and a representative from the Central Bank of Liberia as well as key
international partners, including UNMIL, was established to oversee the demobili-
zation process in 2005.42 In the following year a United States–funded security-
sector review was conducted by the RAND Corporation, an institute close to the
major defense organizations in the United States. This report was seen as the basis
for a national dialogue on security-sector reform.43 The commission held several
rounds of consultations with security agencies, government bodies, international
partners, and civil society. The definition of the respective roles of the AFL, the
Liberian National Police (LNP), the Liberian Seaport Police, the Police Quick Reac-
tion Unit, the SSS, the Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization, Customs, and
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other key security agencies was apparently a difficult process. Only in late November
2007 was the national security strategy being finalized. The National Security Council
was expected to adopt the document by the end of 2007. Structural issues, such as the
overlapping mandates of existing security agencies would be addressed by reducing
the number of agencies to a more rational and sustainable number.44
The LNP only gradually became operational again. While the transitional gov-
ernment made efforts to regularly pay increased salaries to newly trained police
officers, it was unable to raise the $4 million required to cover the decommission-
ing of personnel from the LNP and the SSS who were ineligible to join the new,
restructured services.45 UNMIL found it necessary to recommend a revision of the
appointment process to ensure transparency in hiring procedures and merit-based
promotions.46 However, the presence of the LNP in the interior of the country
remained very low. This was at least partially the result of the unavailability of
suitable housing, vehicles, and communications infrastructure. By September
2006 the LNP had deployed only 454 officers throughout the fifteen counties in
Liberia. The UN police worked with the LNP to rationalize the high number of
officers assigned to the Monrovia headquarters.47 The rehabilitation of police sta-
tions in the periphery progressed slowly.48 All this showed that the population,
particularly outside Monrovia, could not rely on protection from the police even
three years after the war had ended.49
The United States–led program to restructure the AFL led, in a first phase, to the
demobilization of 9,400 irregular personnel who had been recruited into the armed
forces after the outbreak of the civil war in 1989, with each conscript receiving $540
in severance pay. A second phase started in October 2005 and was to lead to the
retirement of 4,273 regular members recruited before the conflict, but because of
a lack of funds—some provided by South Africa and the United States—this process
was slower than expected.50 In the end, the aim was to have an army of 2,000 troops.
As of November 2007, 645 recruits had completed their basic training. The force
was expected to grow to 1,100 soldiers by February 2008 and to 1,600 soldiers by
May 2008. Sovereignty was far from being achieved at this point. The government
would assume control over the AFL only after the conclusion of the entire training
program (expected in November 2009 at the earliest). As of October 2007, less than
5 percent of the force consisted of former AFL soldiers, and no ethnic group
accounted for more than 15 percent. The demobilization of previous AFL officers
resulted in a situation where no experienced company-grade officers were available
to command infantry companies. The U.S. and Liberian governments therefore sug-
gested that Economic Community of West African States member states provide
commanders for the first three AFL companies for an interim period. The distrust
of the AFL (and the LNP and SSS) was such that Security Council resolutions
authorized only trained and vetted members of these corps to operate weapons. In
November 2007, AFL weapons remained in the custody of the United States and its
contractors.51 This outside domination of the security sector was not entirely legit-
imate in the eyes of Liberians.52 Despite numerous efforts to reform the sector, the
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balance sheet still appeared to be below expectations in 2009, with the UN secretary-
general noting ‘‘significant capacity deficits.’’53
A surprisingly positive picture resulted from a poll on security providers in urban
Liberia conducted (by a team under the aegis of this article’s author) in late 2005.
Responding to open questions, 18.4 percent cited the police as the most important
group for their personal safety. When asked more specifically whether they felt pro-
tected or threatened by the police, only 0.7 percent of our respondents saw the police
as a big threat to their personal security; 2.2 percent rated them as somewhat of a
threat, while 4.6 percent claimed that the LNP did not affect their personal security
at all. Accordingly, 32.2 and 60.3 percent saw the police as serving a protective func-
tion (somewhat important for my personal security, very important for my personal
security).54 The rating for the army was worse. Responding to similar questions,
only 2.0 percent said it was the most important group for their personal safety. When
asked whether they felt protected or threatened by the AFL, 4.4 percent of our
respondents saw the army as a big threat to their personal security and 5.1 percent
as somewhat of a threat. This means that roughly every tenth person had a negative
(or very negative) opinion of the army. Rather surprisingly low was the number of
respondents, 24.3 percent, who said that the AFL did not affect their personal secu-
rity at all—given the fact that the army was not operational and only in training at
that time. The 41.1 percent who rated the AFL as ‘‘somewhat important for my per-
sonal security’’ and the 25.0 percent who said it was ‘‘very important for my per-
sonal security’’ are surprising for the same reason: AFL was hardly operational in
that period. This can be interpreted only as wishful thinking—what the AFL should
be—as they could not be seen as being effective in practice at the time of our inquiry.
The Liberian example shows how the onset of the brutal civil war in 1989 quickly
transformed the official army into an armed faction. Parallel structures were also
quickly established. Warlord president Taylor excelled at this art; no single body
of the security forces was at the service of the population after 1997. The year
2003 was the watershed that ended a period of completely arbitrary rule. Liberia’s
generally peaceful situation since the peace agreement of Accra in that year—but
likely more the result of the external intervention in and oversight over the security
forces—has contributed to the relative satisfaction of the population with the secu-
rity forces. Considerable attention has been given to the clear distribution of roles
within the security apparatus, which should reduce overlaps in mandates. It may
be too early to attribute this relative success of the first steps in security-sector
reform to the indeed heavy investments as long as peacekeeping troops are still pres-
ent. Doubts persist as to whether the capacity of state security forces will be suffi-
cient to deal with security challenges in the medium term. The political will of
the Tolbert, Doe, and Taylor regimes to promote a republican army was obviously
low; the present Johnson–Sirleaf administration can be rated much more highly in
this regard, at least for the moment. A synthesis of the main features of security
forces in Liberia and Central African Republic shows a number of similar character-
istics, but also marked differences (table 2).
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Conclusions
It is obvious that the state security forces in both Liberia and the CAR have had a
very low capacity, both before and after major episodes of civil war and rebellion.
Structure and composition have been important topics of the externally sponsored
security-sector reform. In Liberia, the phase of violent turmoil has come to an end,
Table 2. Official Security Forces in the Central African Republic (CAR) and Liberia and
Their Security Performance
CAR Liberia
Capacity (International Institute
for Strategic Studies, ‘‘Military
Balance 2008’’)
3,150 2,400
Security apparatus operates as
‘‘state in state’’ (score and
rank; ‘‘Failed States Index
2009’’)
9.6 (rank 8) 6.9 (rank 53)
Security-sector reform—2009
status
Conceptualization phase Advanced (in progress)
Insecurity induced by security
forces
Constantly high since 1996 High before and during first
civil war, low since 2003
Security provided by security
forces
Constantly low since 1996 Low until 2003, limited but
growing since 2005
Main factors influencing
performance
Negative: Negative:
Politicization of armed
forces/frequent reorgani-
zations along ethnic lines
Politicization of armed
forces/some reorganiza-
tions along ethnic lines
Top hierarchy involved in
politico-military turmoil
Rank and file involved in
politico-military turmoil
Rank and file involved in
politico-military turmoil
Top hierarchy involved in
politico-military turmoil
Nonpayment of salaries Civil wars and their effects
Mutinies and their effects
Rebellions and their effects
Positive: Positive:
Limited effects of outside
advisors
Initial results of security-
sector reform
Limited effects of security-
sector reform
Heavy presence of UN
peacekeepers
Sources: International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), ‘‘The Military Balance 2008’’ (London: IISS,
2008); Fund for Peace, ‘‘Failed States Index 2009,’’ http://www.fundforpeace.org/web/index.php?option¼
com_content&task¼view&id¼292&Itemid¼452 (accessed October, 13 2009); and compilation by the
author of qualitative data.
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probably more the result of the physical presence of a strong UN mission than
changes in the military and political setup. Today’s government is credited with
having a rather strong political will to transform the security forces into well-
functioning institutions, something that is much less apparent in the CAR. Civil soci-
ety is weak in both countries. In Liberia, however, it is at least associated with
security-sector reform; in the CAR this connection is very superficial.
African security forces are more complex entities than many believe, and per-
spectives from below, from above, and from outside may not produce an identical
picture. In countries with a long-time record of peace it is not uncommon to find
a ‘‘republican’’ army, that is, an army oriented toward the common good, and also
police forces committed to people’s security. This is usually not the case in countries
that have gone through protracted phases of violent conflict. A severe crisis of con-
fidence of the state’s security forces in many African states can be assumed and is
certainly demonstrated in both case studies. The effect of outside engagement is
probably limited. In the case of Liberia, it can be claimed that outside intervention
in the form of peacemaking, peacekeeping, and finally peace building was effective
only after two decades of turmoil and disintegration in the formal security forces.
While it is possible that the international community’s engagement in security-
sector reform will be conducive to a professional army outside the immediate reach
of the president in Liberia, the limited efforts in the CAR have not yet produced
apparent peace or republican security forces. Ongoing conflict itself explains more:
in prolonged crises without a clear winner, security forces are often characterized by
internal cleavages, with entire segments siding with a specific conflict party or indi-
vidual battalions defecting to ‘‘the enemy.’’ Fighting rebellions and suffering casu-
alties puts security forces under stress and may result in an even worse performance
record. Because of infighting, the security forces contribute to the difficulty of estab-
lishing a monopoly on the use of violence. The political weight, material equipment,
and self-esteem or humiliation of an entire corps may play roles in the actual beha-
vior of those forces—and in the production of security for the ordinary people.
The meaning of state security forces for the security of the population is still
largely enigmatic, although there are indications that in many countries such forces
are perceived rather as sources of insecurity. In both case studies the record of the
security forces is problematic. And without fundamental change to the social habits
in the CAR and Liberia (plus a change of the political system in the CAR), the pos-
sibility of better security forces in the medium term will likely remain an elusive
goal. Based on the CAR’s experience, it also appears to be difficult to reform a sector
as long as violent conflicts are not definitively settled. The intermediate near to pro-
tectorate status of Liberia has allowed for a more fundamental restart, although it is
far from guaranteed that the advanced security-sector reform can be sustainable, par-
ticularly when the self-help mechanisms intended to compensate for the lack of
state-sponsored security are simply ignored.
Seen from outside, both the state and its security forces must be strengthened and
reformed; however, too frequently this is done according to a blueprint model that
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does not take local expectations and experiences into account. Furthermore, the
security forces are usually ‘‘partners’’ in such endeavors, although popular trust in
them is obviously limited. The language of official donor documents is therefore full
of hypocritical statements. While strong international involvement in the security
sectors of war-ravaged states offers a good basis for reform and may be regarded
as its necessary precondition, it is evidently far from sufficient.
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